the network
The research network “religion and the emotions” or ,,Religion und Emotionen.” is funded by the German Research Foundation (project number: 468734977) since 2021 and was applied for by Hartmut von Sass from Humboldt-University to Berlin.
thematic preliminary clarifications
Regarding the title: “Religion and the Emotions” – that is not to say that there is one religion, but a multitude of emotions. The singular indicates that the focus is not on a specific religious tradition, but rather on the fact that most cultures develop and cultivate ultimate relationships. At the same time, the singular indicates that one cannot address religion without looking at a specific religious tradition - whereby the methodological question then always arises as to whether the insights gained can be generalized. In this sense of a heuristic premise, the Christian tradition is the subject and interlocutor in this project. In addition to the conceptual and phenomenological clarification of the 'emotions', we are trying to find the 'and' (or: and) in the title, i.e. the conjunctive connection between the two thematic poles. According to Herder and Schleiermacher, religion is only alive in "feeling". The direction of the question must also be inverted: What does dealing with the Christian religion do for the clarification of emotions - a question that has been completely neglected up to now!
Emotion research, including and especially philosophical research, peaked about ten to 15 years ago. This is documented in numerous publications, including qualification papers and interdisciplinary cooperation. Theology had benefited from this, albeit with the usual "trade deficit" that, if results were imported, genuine theological work was hardly received outside of the subject (a major exception: Perler 2011, esp. Chapters I and II).
five thematic priorities – one research field
Factually, emotions are extremely heterogeneous phenomena; conceptually, this heterogeneity is reflected, to which a rich semantic adjacency is added: 'feelings', 'moods', 'affects', 'sensations'. It is not clear whether this is an independent research object at all (on the factual and conceptual diversity cf. Scarantino / de Sousa 2018, Section 1). This prompted three reactions: Either one concludes from this plurality that emotions do not designate a natural kind (so A. Rorty 1980, 1) or one hopes for the elimination of 'emotion' as a hardly helpful covering term through more appropriate alternatives ( see Griffiths 1997, esp. 246f.) or one sticks to the basic unity of concept and what is designated by it. Aware of the problems suggested by the first two reactions, we choose the last option.
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But that needs to be justified. Accordingly, the first focus has to be on the theoretical design of approaches that seek a balance between the analysis of individual emotions (such as gratitude, envy, hope, etc.), on which many of the network members have worked, and a general theory , which can capture those particular emotions without reductionism (our members have also submitted works on this; e.g. Döring 2003; Weber-Guskar 2009, 13-36) (1).
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However, this debate has been conducted without the systematic reference to genuine theological literature. That would be no harm if the theological tradition of the 18th century had not presented fully developed emotional theories together with a robust, albeit dogmatically motivated, descriptive apparatus (2).
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Already at that time, but especially in the aftermath of the debates initiated with Herder, de Wette and Fries, the problem of the (non-)rationality of emotions had to arise, which the network will specifically address by bringing together previously separate discourses (3) .
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But then it becomes possible to examine the consequences of emotion research for specific systems, life forms and practices in a methodically careful and phenomenologically sensitive manner, which leads to emotions as an aspect of our everyday embedding (4).
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Ultimately, it is about questions that concern our (reflexive-critical) relationship to this lifeworld and thus genuine ethical and political implications of the emotions between passivity, motivation and commitment (5).
(1) to (5) are held together by two different brackets. On the one hand, formally: in all the contexts mentioned, a consensual concept of emotion or a sufficiently clarified variety in the use of the concept is already implied. There is thus this at-least heuristic unity of the concept that we actualize when we use that concept. Exactly what the semantic content consists of is disputed in the Anglo-Saxon, but also continental debate; the network should contribute to the clarification. On the other hand, in terms of content: the five focal points lead to the hitherto marginalized question of the anthropological location of emotions, which leads to subject areas that were once treated under the label of 'existentialism' or the phenomenology of the living environment. This describes one of the most exciting desiderata in our disciplines and at the same time one of the few fields to which analytical philosophy has not yet devoted itself in detail. An analytical philosophy and theology of existence (cf. the very interesting diagnosis by Th. Grundmann 2017) is lacking and it could offer an informative framework for emotion research. This not only affects questions of existential meaning, the meaning of life and death, but also the fundamental focus on illuminating the fulfillment of existence. Emotions apparently play such a central role for him that they are still underestimated.
A network is exactly the right format for institutional integration and long-term support for these problems.
All focal points can now be specified in such a way that they are each developed in a three-step process: The general problem is followed by a problem-oriented exposition in order to derive specific research questions for our network. These emphases are designed so that their presentation may be heuristically helpful without detracting from the various interests of our members.